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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE
DISMISSALS AND OTHER ADVERSE ACTIONS
Richard C. Johnsont and Richard G. Stoll, Jr#f
The federal government is the United States' largest employer.
Even excluding the armed forces, approximately 2.8 million persons
are currently employed in the federal civil service.' Unlike most private
employers who can fire, suspend, demote, and discipline their employees
for any reason or for no reason, the federal government as an employer
is subject to legal restraints.2 For example, statutory and regulatory law
forbid the government from taking "adverse actions,"3 such as removal,
suspension, or demotion, against most civil service employees except
"for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."-, Those
employees covered by the Veterans' Preference Act 5 are protected from
the imposition of adverse employer actions without minimal procedural
safeguards. 6 In addition, procedural safeguards relating to adverse ac-
tions have recently been granted to almost all other federal employees
in the competitive service through executive order 7 or regulations of
the Civil Service Commission.8 Hence most federal employees today are
at least minimally protected both substantively and procedurally against
improper or capricious adverse actions.
If a dismissal or other adverse action is upheld after exhaustion of
the procedures available in the employing agency and in the Civil Ser-
" Member of the District of Columbia Bar. A.B. 1958, LL.B 1962, Harvard University.
it Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1968, Westminster College; J.D.
1971, Georgetown University.
1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DFP'T oF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRAaI OF THE
UNrrEe STATES: 1971, at 388 (1971).
2 Strenuous efforts have been made to equate federal or state governments with
private employers for purposes of defining the employer-employee relationship. See, e.g.,
McAuliffe v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). Such efforts have
by and large failed. See, e.g., Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 703-04 (D.R.I. 1969).
3 An "adverse action," as generally defined in the Civil Service regulations, means re-
moval, suspension for more than 30 days, furlough without pay, or reduction in grade or
pay. 5 C.F.R. § 752.201(b) (1971).
4 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(a), 7512(a) (1970); 5 C.F.R. § 752.104(a) (1971).
5 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108, 7511-12, 7701 (1970).
6 Such safeguards include 30 days advance written notice of a proposed adverse action,
opportunity to reply personally in writing and to furnish supporting affidavits, and a
right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7701 (1970).
7 Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521, 527 (1959-63 Comp.), issued under authority
granted by 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
8 See 5 C.F.R. § 752 (1971) (adverse actions by agencies); id. § 771 (appeals within
agencies); id. § 772 (appeals to the Civil Service Commission).
EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL REVIEW
vice Commission, a government employee may turn to the federal
courts to secure reinstatement and to recover back pay for the period of
his alleged wrongful dismissal, demotion, or suspension. However,
unlike many other areas of government action in which a person ad-
versely affected can seek judicial review through relatively clear statu-
tory procedures," judicial review of agency adverse actions has not been
regulated by a single statute specifically addressed to the problem.
As in other areas of administrative law, the most important check
upon capricious or illegal government action is an independent system
of judicial review.' 0 For a review procedure actually to provide such a
beneficial check, especially when the person adversely affected is gener-
ally a low- to moderate-income individual, it should offer a reasonably
simple, economical, expeditious, and efficient means of obtaining re-
view. Unfortunately, there exists today a somewhat complex, frequently
costly, often tediously slow, and certainly inefficient system of judicial
review of federal employee adverse actions. The purpose of this article
is to point out the exasperating confusion and inefficient duplication of
effort that currently exist in the system, and to suggest a simple statu-
tory solution to the problem.
I
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADVERSE ACTIONS
A. Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts
An unusual pattern of judicial review emerges at the very outset
when the disgruntled employee discovers, after exhausting his admin-
istrative remedies within the employing agency and the Civil Service
Commission, that one of his paths of review is to the federal district
court, rather than to a court of appeals. The reason is simply that there
is no statute conferring jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to hear
these cases directly.
The district courts, however, have concluded on several statutory
bases that they have jurisdiction to review adverse action decisions of
9 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970) (appeals of final orders of the FTC must go to a
United States Court of Appeals). See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
10 It is a basic proposition that absent a clear mandate of Congress to the contrary,
a person whose interests are directly and adversely affected by action on the part of the
federal government should have the opportunity to seek judicial review once the pertinent
administrative remedies have been exhausted. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 140 (1967); 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-02, 704 (1970) (judicial review provisions of the Adminis.
trative Procedure Act); L. JArE, JUDIcIAL CoNTRoL OF ADMINIMSrRATIVE ACrnON 336-53
(1965).
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the Civil Service Commission. District courts have variously cited as
the bases for jurisdiction the basic federal question and diversity
statutes,' 1 the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act,12 the judicial review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),' 3 and the statu-
tory provisions relating to mandamus and venue for mandamus.' 4
Many cases, on the other hand, have failed to discuss the jurisdictional
issue at all. For example, an opinion may merely term the litigation "an
action for reinstatement"'15 or a "government employee discharge
case." 6 In spite of this diversity of opinion, however, federal district
courts have uniformly concluded that they do have jurisdiction to re-
view employee adverse actions, and they will direct reinstatement
of an employee if they conclude that a dismissal was wrongful.' 7
When the courts do cite authority for their jurisdiction in review-
ing employee adverse actions, the mandamus statute' 8 and the judicial
review provisions of the APA'9 are by far the most common. The
mandamus statute currently in effect provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in
the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the
plaintiff.20
11 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1970); see, e.g., Benson v. United States, 421 F.2d 515 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 943 (1970).
12 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970); see, e.g., Camero v. McNamara, 222 F. Supp. 742 (E.D.
Pa. 1963); see also Benson v. United States, 421 F.2d 515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
943 (1970); Mendez v. Macy, 292 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Murphy v. Kelley, 259 F.
Supp. 914 (D. Mass.), af'd mem., 368 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 1966); cf. DeLong v. Hampton, 422
F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1970).
13 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970); see, e.g., Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d
Cir. 1969); Fagan v. Schroeder, 284 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1960); Hargett v. Summerfield, 243
F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 970 (1957); Mindel v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F.
Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Jenkins v. Macy, 237 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1964), af'd, 357
F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1966); May v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 230 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. La. 1963);
but see Capolino v. Kelly, 236 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 339 F.2d 1028
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 858 (1965).
14 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1970); see, e.g., Taylor v. Civil Sery. Comm'n, 374 F.2d
466 (9th Cir. 1967); Capolino v. Kelly, 236 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 339
F2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 858 (1965); Seebach v. Cullen, 224 F. Supp.
15 (N.D. Cal. 1963), af'd, 338 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 972 (1965);
Camero v. McNamara, 222 F. Supp,. 742 (E.D. Pa. 1963); cf. Fagan v. Schroeder, 284 F.2d
666 (7th Cir. 1960).
15 E.g., Steck v. Connally, 199 F. Supp. 104, 105 (D.D.C. 1961).
16 E.g., Pelicone v. Hodges, 320 F.2d 754, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
17 Mindel v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
19 5 id. §§ 701.06.
20 28 id. § 1361. This section is almost always cited together with a section of the
venue statute:
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It should be noted that the statute speaks not of a "writ of mandamus,"
but rather of an "action in the nature of mandamus." It is clear from
the cases that courts do not treat the action with the old, restric-
tive ministerial-discretionary dichotomy in mind, but rather view the
scope of review more broadly.21
The other statute most frequently cited by district courts as the
jurisdictional basis for reinstatement is the Administrative Procedure
Act.22 The broad judicial review provisions of the Act provide that,
except where judicial review is precluded by statute or where action is
committed by law to agency discretion,23 "[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof."24 Judicial application of this statute to adverse
actions has been inconsistent and confusing. Although many courts
have apparently assumed that they have jurisdiction to review adverse
actions under the APA, there is still considerable debate in academic
circles and in courts as to whether the APA is jurisdictional in and of
itself.25 One court has even squarely held that the APA precludes by
its very terms judicial review of employee adverse actions.26
A civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal
authority, or an agency of the United States, may, except as otherwise provided
by law, be brought in any judicial district in which: (1) a defendant in the action
resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the
action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the
action.
Id. § 1391(e).
Both sections were added in 1962. Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744.
Together, they allow a plaintiff to se k reinstatement to federal employment in the district
in which he resides. This right of action had previously been severely restricted, in that
only the District of Columbia District Court had jurisdiction to hear such actions "in the
nature of mandamus." Compare Fagan v. Schroeder, 284 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1960), with
Camero v. McNamara, 222 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Pa. 1963), and Seebach v. Cullen, 224 F. Supp.
15 (N.D. Cal. 1963), aft'd, 338 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 972 (1965).
21 For an excellent treatment of the 1962 "action in the nature of mandamus" legis.
lation in general and its application to judicial review of employee adverse action cases in
particular, see Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 308,
342-44 (1967).
22 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
23 Id. § 701(a).
24 Id. § 702.
25 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326, 330-31 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
399 US. 911 (1970); L. JAFFE, supra note 10, at 164.65; Byse & Fiocca, supra note 20, at
326-31.
26 Capolino v. Kelly, 236 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 339 F.2d 1023 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 858 (1965). See Democratic State Cent. Comm. v. Andolsek,
249 F. Supp. 1009, 1017 (D. Md. 1966).
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Another statute frequently invoked by courts in this type of action
is the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act.27 At least one court has cor-
rectly pointed out, however, that that statute does not create jurisdic-
tion for federal courts, but only provides a type of remedy once federal
jurisdiction is found to exist.28
B. Scope of Review in the Federal District Courts
There has been a fair amount of disagreement concerning the
scope of district court review. However, although the outer limits of
judicial review are as yet only vaguely defined,29 there is a well estab-
27 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
28 Fagan v. Schroeder, 284 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1960).
The Back Pay Act of 1966 (5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1970) ) is similar to the Federal Declaratory
Judgments Act in that it is remedial rather than jurisdictional. The Back Pay Act provides
in relevant part:
(b) An employee of an agency who, on the basis of an administrative deter-
mination or a timely appeal, is found by appropriate authority under applicable
law or regulation to have undergone an unjustified or unwarranted personnel
action that has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of the
pay, allowances, or differentials of the employee-
(1) is entitled, on correction of the personnel action, to receive for the
period for which the personnel action was in effect an amount equal to all or
any part of the pay, allowances, or differentials, as applicable, that the em-
ployee normally would have earned during that period if the personnel action
had not occurred, less any amounts earned by him through other employment
during that period ....
Id. § 5596(b)(1 ) .
Prior to 1964, the federal district courts were prohibited from granting any "fees,
salary, or compensation for official services" to employees of the United States in any civil
action or claim. (Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1346(d)(2), 62 Stat. 933). By the 1964 amend-
ment to the Federal Judicial Code, district courts are prohibited only from hearing claims
for "pensions," and hence are empowered to entertain requests for the remedy granted by
the Back Pay Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(d) (1970).
29 The Civil Service regulations do not provide an adequate guide as to when employee
dismissals will promote the efficiency of the service. Some examples and exclusions are given,
but several raise more difficulties than they solve. Some listed grounds for dismissal are
(1) criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct; (2) inten-
tional false statement, deception, or fraud in examination or appointment; (3) habitual and
excessive use of intoxicating beverages; and (4) reasonable doubt as to loyalty to the United
States Government. In addition there is a "catchall" category of "[a]ny legal or other dis-
qualification which makes the individual unfit for the service." 5 C.F.R. §§ 731201 (b)-(g)
(1971). The regulations specifically exclude such grounds as marital status, or political
activities (except when required by statute) (Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1970) (the Hatch Act));
race, sex or national origin; and physical handicap if the duties required may be efficiently
performed with such a handicap. 5 C.F.R. § 752.104 (1971). For a general survey and dis-
cussion of causes for dismissal that have been relied on by agencies, see Chaturvedi, Legal
Protection Available to Federal Employees Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 NW. U.L. Rxv.
287, 290-307 (1968).
Until recently, courts would refuse to second guess the Civil Service Commission as to
what constitutes "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." For example,
the District of Columbia Circuit stated in 1949 that "the. courts have uniformly held that
[Vol. 57:178
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lished basis for at least three possible interpretations of the proper
scope of review of employee actions: (1) the court may reverse if it
finds that the required procedures were not followed by the agency
in effecting the dismissal;30 (2) the court may reverse if it finds either
that proper procedures were not followed or that the decision was
"arbitrary or capricious";31 or (3) the court may reverse if it finds
the administrative determination by the employing agency of what constitutes cause for
discharge will not be judicially reviewed." Carter v. Forrestal, 175 F.2d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 832 (1949) (employee dismissed for continually avoiding payment of
lawful debts). This rule was stated with approval as recently as 1966: "[1]t has been estab-
lished that an administrative determination by the employing agency of what constitutes
'such cause as will promote the efficiency of such service' in cases of removal will not be
reviewed judicially." Murphy v. Kelley, 259 F. Supp. 914, 917 n.l (D. Mass.), affd mem.,
368 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 1966) (employee dismissed for unauthorized use of government auto-
mobile).
However, the District of Columbia Circuit recently reversed a dismissal even though it
was effected through proper procedures and was based upon substantial evidence. In Nor-
ton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court ruled that dismissal for an employee's
off-duty homosexual conduct would not promote the efficiency of the service, and was
therefore "an arbitrary ground for dismissal." Id, at 1167. The majority opinion, written by
Chief Judge Bazelon, met with a strong dissent by Judge Tamm:
The majority once again violates the judicial cloister erected by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and rushes out, robes flying, into the forbidden area of
administrative discretion to give kind assistance to the subject of what it feels to
be highwayman tactics at the hands of the Civil Service Commission....
, , * I have felt constrained to follow this view time and again, [that where
procedures are properly complied with a dismissal is not reviewable as to its wis-
dom or good judgment] ... although in so doing I remain a vox clamantis in
deserto.
Id. at 1168-69. A recent case has followed the Norton majority and held that a dismissal in
which procedures were properly followed and which was based upon substantial evidence
should be reversed because there was no basis offered for the dismissal that would in the
court's view promote the efficiency of the service. The case involved a postal clerk living out
of wedlock with a woman. Mindel v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Besides holding that the dismissal was arbitrary and capricious (id. at 487), Mindel held
that the dismissal of this employee because of his private sex life violated his ninth amend-
ment right to privacy. Id. at 488. But see Schlegel v. United States, 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
30 Benson v. United States, 421 F.2d 515, 517-18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 943
(1970); Seebach v. Cullen, 338 F.2d 663, 664 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 972 (1965);
Fagan v. Schroeder, 284 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1960); Whiting v, Campbell, 275 F.2d 905,
906 (5th Cir. 1960); Chiriaco v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 850, 852 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff'd,
339 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1964). "Judicial review of dismissal from federal employment,
a matter of executive agency discretion, is limited to a determination of whether the re-
quired procedural steps have been substantially complied with." Seebach v. Cullen, supra
at 664.
81 See, Pauley v. United States, 419 F.2d 1061, 1065 (7th Cir. 1969); Charlton v. United
States, 412 F.2d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1969) (concurring opinion); McTiernan v. Gronouski, 337
F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1964); Murphy v. Kelley, 259 F. Supp. 914, 917 (D. Mass.), aff'd mem.,
368 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 1966); Taylor v. Macy, 252 F. Supp. 1021, 1023 (S.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd
susb nom. Taylor v. Civil Serv. Conm'n, 374 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967).
The overwhelming weight of authority holds that judicial review of employee
1972]
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that proper procedures were not followed, that the decision was arbi-
trary and capricious, or that the decision was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record.32
Conflicting opinions as to the proper scope of review cannot be
explained by the confusion over the basis of jurisdiction.3 3 Courts that
have assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the Administrative Procedure
Act, for example, have not agreed on the proper scope of review., 4
In this regard, it is interesting to compare the majority and the con-
curring opinions in the recent case of Charlton v. United States.3
There the lower court, in an unreported decision, dismissed an
employee's appeal because "there [had] been substantial compliance
with all the applicable procedural and statutory requirements."36 The
court concluded, therefore, that "[w]e cannot inquire further into the
matter." 37 The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the scope of judi-
cial review section of the APA38 required that the lower court also deter-
mine whether the dismissal was supported by substantial evidence before
it could affirm the dismissal. 39 The persuasive concurring opinion of
Judge Stahl, on the other hand, noted "the distressing absence of uni-
formity in the scope of judicial review on employee discharge appeals," 40
disciplinary actions is limited to insuring that required procedures have been
substantially complied with and that the action taken was not arbitrary or capri-
dous.
Pauley v. United States, supra at 1065.
32 Toohey v. Nitze, 429 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022
(1971); Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1969); Vigil v. Post Office Dep't,
406 F.2d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 1969); Dabney v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 533, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Mendez v. Macy, 292 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Jenkins v. Macy, 237 F. Supp. 60, 62
(E.D. Mo. 1964), aJ'd, 357 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1966) (adequate evidence).
In summary, we are of the opinion that the scope of judicial review of a
federal agency's action with respect to the dismissal or discipline of a civil service
employee extends to the determination whether procedural requirements have
been satisfied in the administrative proceedings, and whether the administrative
record establishes that substantial evidence supports the agency's action and that
it was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.
Charlton v. United States, supra at 395 (footnote omitted).
38 See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
34 Compare Fagan v. Schroeder, 284 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 1960) (judidal review of
employee adverse actions under the APA is limited to whether there has been compliance
with applicable procedures), with Mendez v. Macy, 292 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(substantial evidence rule must be applied in reviewing employee adverse actions under the
APA).
35 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969) (dismissal of IRS employee for failure to report at-
tempted bribery and failure to care properly for official documents).
36 Id. at 391.
37 Id.
38 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
39 412 F.2d at 395.
40 Id. at 400 n.8.
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and indicated that an "arbitrary and capricious" rather than a "sub-
stantial evidence" standard should be considered. 41
There is one matter upon which all the district and circuit courts
apparently agree. It is not the function of the reviewing district court
to hold a de novo hearing on the matter. Rather, no matter which of
the three interpretations is followed, the court must review the case
and affirm or reverse solely on the basis of the administrative record.
The type of review that the district courts are thus required to exercise
is identical to that of the courts of appeals in the federal system.
C. Jurisdiction and Scope of Review of the Court of Claims
The aggrieved federal employee, with the Civil Service Commis-
sion's adverse decision in hand, does not have to go to the federal dis-
trict court, but may proceed instead to the Court of Claims. With this
two-track approach a primary goal of a workable system of judicial
review-simplicity-has been lost.
The statute that authorizes the Court of Claims to hear suits by
dissatisfied federal employees 42 states in pertinent part:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judg-
ment upon any claim against the United States founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract
41 Judge Stahl's conclusion seems correct if one accepts the APA as the basis of juris-
diction, for 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970) limits the application of the substantial evidence
standard to cases covered by sections 556-57 of the Act, which specifically exclude matters
involving the "selection and tenure" of employees. Id. §§ 554(a)(2), 556-57. Section 706 pro-
vides in relevant part:
The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by sustantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title or othenvise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute ....
It is dear that the substantial evidence test applies only in two situations: (1) in cases
subject to id. §§ 556-57; and (2) when agency hearings are otherwise required by statute.
By virture of id. § 554(a)(2), employee adverse action cases are not subject to sections 556
and 557, so the first criterion cannot be met; and, although employees are entitled to a
hearing by virtue of Civil Service Commission regulations (5 C.F.R. § 771.208(a) (1971)), no
statute requires a hearing, so the second criterion cannot be met either. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 7501, 7512 (1970).
42 28 US.C. § 1491 (1970), as amended, Act of July 23, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-350, § l(b),
84 Stat. 449.
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with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages
in cases not sounding in tort.4 3
This statute and its predecessors have been held applicable to claims
arising out of federal employment since the 1871 case of Patton v.
United States,44 where the Court of Claims stated:
All questions of salary are questions of contract.... [T]he Gov-
ernment contracts to pay the officer his salary, and, failing to do so,
is liable to be sued therefor ....
We hold, therefore, that this court has jurisdiction of this
case.4 5
Relief provided by the Court of Claims is limited to money judg-
ments .4  Nevertheless, its jurisdiction to hear cases of this nature and
either to award compensation for services performed or to award back
pay to persons wrongfully discharged,47 necessarily carries with it the
power to determine whether an "adverse action" was wrongful or not.
Thus the court has recently affirmed that it can "correct" what it finds
to be a wrongful adverse action even though it does not have authority
to direct reinstatement of an employee.48 And as a practical matter,
a money judgment in favor of an employee often has the effect of
accomplishing reinstatement, for the government is not likely to con-
tinue paying one who is not working.49 Except in the matter of reme-
dies, then, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to review Civil Ser-
vice Commission adverse actions is presently coextensive with that of
the district courts.
As with both district court and court of appeals decisions, Court
43 Id.
44 7 Ct. C1. 362 (1871).
45 Id. at 371. See United States v. Harmon, 43 F. 560, 563-65 (C.C. Me. 1890), aff'd,
147 U.S. 268, 272-76 (1893).
46 Gaines v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 925, 930 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
47 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1970); see note 27 supra.
48 Ainsworth v. United States, 399 F.2d 176 (Ct. CI. 1968).
The Court of Claims in Ainsworth, quoting a dissenting opinion from an earlier Court of
Claims case, stated:
It is true that it is not within the power of this court to order the Secretary
of the Treasury to reinstate the plaintiff. However, the practical effect of our
judgment is to put the plaintiff back on the payroll of the United States ....
He gets a judgment now for the pay he would have earned to date, and the
next year he can bring another suit for his pay for that year, and so on until
he is formally reinstated and discharged according to law.
We find, therefore, that this court is a "proper authority" . . . which corrects
an unjustified personnel action by deciding that a separation was ineffective and
awarding the injured employee back pay.
Id. at 181, quoting McGuire v. United States, 145 Ct. C. 17, 24-25 (1959) (dissenting
opinion).
49 See 399 F.2d at 181.
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of Claims decisions on the scope of review of adverse actions have been
inconsistent.50 The different standards of review applied by the court
fall generally within the three interpretations set forth earlier'1 and
do not require separate discussion and analysis. Also, as the other fed-
eral courts, the Court of Claims has been consistent in treating its
scope of review as limited, and will not hold an adverse action to have
been wrongful merely because the court would have drawn different
conclusions from the facts on the record.52
One anomalous practice followed by the court, however, is dis-
turbing in its implications for the healthy development of the admin-
istrative process in this field. If it feels that the record before it was
not adequately developed by the employing agency or the Civil Service
Commission, the court will often remand the matter to one of its own
trial commissioners and direct him to hold a limited fact-finding hear-
ing.53 For example, in Camero v. United States,l4 the court noted that
although there were valid grounds and substantial evidence to
support a dismissal, there was a serious question as to whether the
government had violated its own regulations in securing the dismissal,
thereby possibly rendering it procedurally defective. Because the court
felt that the administrative record and the pleadings had not adequately
explored this issue, the matter was remanded to a trial commissioner
for a hearing on the facts. Under similar circumstances a district court
or court of appeals would properly have sent the case back to the Civil
Service Commission.55
50 Compare Jacobowitz v. United States, 424 F.2d 555, 561 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Haynes v.
United States, 418 F.2d 1380, 1381 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Camero v. United States, M45 F.2d 798,
(Ct. Cl. 1965) (all applying the substantial evidence test), with Armstrong v. United States,
405 F.2d 1275, (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 934 (1969); Liotta v. United States, 174 Ct.
Cl. 91, 95 (1966); Sakran v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 831, 838 (1966) (all applying the
arbitrary and capridous test), and Culligan v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 222, 223 (1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 848 (1947) (applying the proper procedures test).
As noted by Judge Stahl of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, two decisions handed
down the same day by the Court of Claims applied different standards of review. Charlton
v. United States, 412 F.2d 390, 599-400 n.8 (3d Cir. 1969) (concurring opinion).
51 See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
52 Haynes v. United States, 418 F.2d 1880, 1384-85 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
53 E.g., Camero v. United States, 345 F.2d 798, 806 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Menick v. United
States, 184 Ct. Cl. 756, 758 (1968); Harrington v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 1110, 1116-18
(1966).
54 345 F.2d 798, 806 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
55 Goodman v. United States, 424 F.2d 914, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Dabney v. Freeman,
358 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In Dabney, the employee argued that she should have been
granted a trial on the factual issues in the district court. The court of appeals stated,
however:
There can, we think, be little doubt that Congress intended personnel grievances
of this kind to be heard and determined in the first instance by the Commission
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The Court of Claims approach places the Civil Service Commission
on an unequal footing with the other major federal administrative
agencies. Under review statutes for such major agencies as the Federal
Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
Civil Aeronautics Board, the federal courts of appeals are required to
remand factual questions to the agencies themselves rather than to the
district courts.15 Application of a different rule by the Court of Claims
seriously detracts from the stature of the Civil Service Commission in
the federal administrative scheme.
II
MODIFICATION OF THE EXISTING F, AMEwORK FOR JUDICIAL REviEw
It is time that serious attention be directed towards the persistent
criticism57 of district court and Court of Claims involvement in em-
ployee discharge cases. Two-step review is a needless expenditure of
and not by the District Court. The latter has enough to do without displacing
the Civil Service Commission in this area, at least without a dearer mandate
from Congress than it now has.
358 F.2d at 535.
56 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970) (FTC).
57 This criticism has been most frequently and cogently voiced by Judge McGowan
of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. In Connelly v. Nitze, 401 F.2d 416
(D.C. Cir. 1968), he stated:
We have pointed out before that these employee discharge cases, although in
form original actions in the District Court, are in reality agency review proceed-
ings and are normally treated as such by all parties.... This creates difficulties,
as here, in our ability to give, effectively and expeditiously, the most appropriate
kind of relief.
Id. at 417 n.l.
In Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968), he noted:
Why there should be a double review of this character-once in the District
Court and once here-is a highly pertinent question, particularly in these days of
over-crowded dockets in all courts. To the extent the Commission aspires to the
-status of an independent agency comparable to those whose decisions are reviewed
directly by the federal courts of appeals, it would seem in the interest of both it
and the federal judicial system to bring this matter to the attention of the Con-
gress.
Id. at 647 n.6.
In 1969, two more cases stimulated similar remarks by Judge McGowan addressed
squarely to Congress and the Commission: "There appears to be no reason why two
courts should be required to review, by reference solely to the administrative record, the
Commission's determinations." Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169, 1171 n.l (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 922 (1970).
This would appear to be another of those cases where the interposition of
the District Court in the judicial review process serves no visible purpose ....
We start at the same point as we do in the cases where Congress has made provi-
sion for direct review by the Courts of Appeals of federal agency action....
Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 234 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
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time and money for all concerned. It is particularly needless since the
district court merely acts in a reviewing capacity and is not required,
or even permitted, 8 to utilize its fact-finding capability. Instead, the
Civil Service Commission's decisions on adverse actions should be
treated as final orders of other major administrative agencies are treated,
and should be appealable directly to a federal court of appeals.
A. Administrative Fact-Finding Procedures
A system by which agency decisions are appealable directly to a
court of appeals presupposes that the agency's procedures afford adverse
parties an opportunity to create an adequate administrative record, so
that the court may decide on the basis of such a record whether the
agency's decision was effected through improper procedures, was arbi-
trary and capricious, or was not based upon substantial evidence. In
fact, adverse action procedures are compatible with a system of direct
appellate court review. Federal courts have consistently, if implicitly,
indicated that the administrative procedures currently available to
employees in adverse action cases either are or can be made adequate
to create a usable record for judicial review. They have repeatedly held
that district courts may not hold de novo fact-finding proceedings, but
instead must either perform their review on the administrative record
before them59 or remand the proceeding for the development of addi-
tional facts at the administrative level.
Occasionally, courts of appeals have directed that an administra-
tive remedy be created so that the facts can be developed. For example,
in Holden v. Finch,60 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
instructed the Civil Service Commission to provide an administrative
process, including an evidentiary hearing if necessary, in spite of the
Commission's abnegation of its own jurisdiction. In Holden, an HEW
employee was discharged during her probationary period and hence was
not covered by the adverse action regulations. Alleging that her dis-
missal was motivated by political considerations and the agency's desire
to suppress her first amendment rights, the employee sought and was
denied review by the Civil Service Commission. She brought an action
against the agency and the Commission, which was dismissed by the
district court.61 The Court of Appeals reversed, stating:
Surely it is one of the central purposes of the Civil Service Commis-
58 See text accompanying note 41 supra; note 59 and accompanying text infra.
59 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
60 446 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cfr. 1971).
61 The unreported dismissal of the action by the district court was noted by the
court of appeals. Id. at 1312.
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sion to inquire, by evidentiary hearing if necessary, into this tangle
of assertion and counter-assertion, and to make a fair and rational
judgment on the question of whether, as the Government insists,
appellant subordinated her public dudes to her personal prepos-
sessions, or whether, as appellant alleges, her performance of the
one was unimpaired by her indulgence of the other.62
In the majority of adverse action cases, however, administrative
procedures are already available, and an adequate record for purposes
of judicial review can be developed. These administrative procedures
consist of a combination of steps taken first by the employing agency
and later by the Civil Service Commission. The involvement of the
employing agency in the adjudication of its rights and responsibilities
vis-A-vis its own employees awakens an initial distrust. Substantial safe-
guards exist, however, a number of which were only recently promul-
gated by the Civil Service Commission.63 While it cannot be said that
an employee faced with an adverse action has all the procedural rights
of a defendant in a criminal trial, the procedures afforded are generally
adequate to assure that no employee will be subject to an adverse action
without full development of the facts involved.
The regulations provide that an agency proposing to take an ad-
verse action must afford the employee a hearing before a neutral ex-
aminer whose qualifications are approved by the Commission. 64 This
hearing may take place at the agency's discretion, either before the
adverse action is taken or afterwards, as part of the employee's appeal
within the agency. 65 Whether the hearing is held at the initial adverse
action stage, or as part of the agency's own appeal process, before taking
action the agency must give the employee at least thirty days written
notice, setting forth in detail the reasons for the proposed action.66
Moreover, the agency must assemble and make available to the em-
ployee all material upon which it relies to support the reasons in
the notice, including statements of witnesses, documents, and other
reports.6
In cases where the agency chooses not to hold a hearing before the
initial adverse action, the employee is allowed to answer the charges
either orally or in writing.68 The agency then makes its initial decision.
It must notify the employee of the adverse decision at the earliest
62 446 F.2d at 1316.
68 These regulations became effective April 1, 1971. 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.101-772.808 (1971).
64 Id. § 771.208(a).
65 Id. § 771.209.
66 Id. § 752.202(a)(1).
67 Id. § 752.202(a)(2).
68 Id. § 752.202(b).
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practicable date, stating specifically which of the reasons in the initial
notice were sustained and fully informing him of his right to appeal.69
An employee who has been subject to an adverse action has the
right to appeal either through his agency's appellate procedure, or to
the Civil Service Commission, or both.70 An "appeal file" must be kept
by the agency, containing all matters relevant to the adverse action,
including a verbatim transcript of the hearing. Within the employing
agency, if there was a hearing prior to the initial adverse action, the
reviewing official is required to make the appellate decision on the
basis of that file, including the verbatim transcript of the hearing.71
The reviewing official must be at a higher administrative level than
the person who took the original adverse action, with one exception
that is somewhat jarring: when the head of the agency makes the origi-
nal decision, he also decides the appeal. 2
At whatever stage the agency chooses to hold a hearing, the em-
ployee is entitled to be represented by a person of his choice.3 The
hearing is conducted by an examiner meeting standards prescribed by
the Commission and not occupying a position under the jurisdiction
of the official who proposed the adverse action or who will make the
decision based upon the examiner's recommendations, unless the official
is the head of the agency.7 4
At the hearing, the rules of evidence need not be strictly applied,
but the examiner must give the parties an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses.75 Both parties are entitled to produce witnesses. After con-
sidering a request by either of the parties the examiner may require
the agency to make its employees available for examination.7" The hear-
ing must be transcribed verbatim 7 The examiner must make a written
report of his findings and recommendations, and specify which of the
charges reviewed have been sustained and which have not. In this re-
port he must also draw conclusions from his findings.78
69 Id. § 752.202(f).
70 However, if his agency has more than one appellate level and he appeals to at
least the second level, he forfeits his right to appeal to the Commission. If he appeals
first to the Commission after the adverse decision, he loses his right to appeal within the
agency. He may appeal to his agency's first appellate level, and then the Commission. See
id. § 771.222(b) (1971).
71 Id..§§ 771.204, .219(a).
'72 Id. § 771.218(a).
73 Id. § 771.208(a).
74 Id. §§ 771.209(a), (b).
75 Id. §§ 771.210(c), (f).
76 Id. §§ 771.211(a), (b).
77 Id. § 771.212(a).
78 Id. § 771.213(a).
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When the hearing follows the original adverse action and takes
place as part of the appeal, the reviewing official making the appellate
decision must accept the examiner's recommendations, except: (1) when
the head of the agency makes the decision, the reviewing official need
only "consider" the recommendations; (2) when the reviewing official
chooses to impose a less severe action than the examiner recommended,
he is free to do so; or (3) when the reviewing official determines that
the recommendations are unacceptable, he may state specifically the
basis for such a determination and transmit the appeal file to a higher
agency authority for decision.7 9
If the agency has a second appellate level, the employee may appeal
again within the agency, but if he does so he loses his right to appeal
to the Civil Service Commission."0 Conversely, he may appeal to the
Commission either immediately after the original adverse action is
taken, or after he has received an adverse decision from his agency's
first appellate level.8 '
There is a right to another hearing before the Appeals Examining
Office of the Civil Service Commission, which exercises initial jurisdic-
tion over the appeal. The rules regarding this hearing are essentially
the same as those for the hearing granted within the agency, except
that testimony may be summarized rather than recorded verbatim.
Either party may submit written exceptions to the summary, which
becomes part of the appeal file. The Appeals Examining Office must
make a written decision in which it must list all of its findings and
recommendations, and state the reasons for the conclusions reached.8 2
The employee has a further right of appeal on the record, without an
evidentiary hearing, to the Commission's Board of Appeals and Re-
view. 3 Finally, the members of the Commission may at their discretion
reopen and reconsider the otherwise final decision of the Board.
8 4
Although these agency and Civil Service Commission procedures
afford an employee many safeguards, there is some room for improve-
ment. For example, nowhere do the regulations explicitly state who has
the burden of proof or the burden of coming forward with evidence at
any of the proceedings, although the cases discussing "substantial evi-
79 Id. § 771.219.
80 See note 70 supra. Foreclosing Commission review on this basis is of doubtful
legality. 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (1970) affords "preference eligible employee[s]" the right to appeal
to the Commission from an adverse action, without qualification of any kind. There is
no decisional authority on this point.
81 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.203, .204, 771.222 (1971).
82 Id. §§ 772.305, .306.
83 Id. §§ 772.307(a), (b).
84 Id. § 772U08.
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dence" make it clear that the burden of proving grounds for adverse
action rests on the government.85
Nevertheless, before an employee has exhausted his administrative
remedies, he will have had the right to at least one and possibly two
hearings conducted by a neutral examiner of an agency of the govern-
ment, at which he will have been able to offer proof and cross-examine
adverse witnesses. And before the adverse action can be initially taken
or upheld against the employee, the allegations and findings must be
specifically articulated and the reasons for any conclusions must be
explained. At least this much can be said about the procedures: by the
time decision is ready for judicial review, there is fair assurance that
there will be a full record of specific allegations, employee responses,
findings of fact, procedures followed, hearing transcripts, recommended
action, and action taken. There is thus little cause to believe that a
reviewing court will not be able adequately to determine whether a
decision was based upon substantial evidence, whether it was arbitrary
or capricious, or whether required procedures were followed in effecting
the adverse action.
B. Direct Court of Appeals Review
A statute providing for direct appeal of adverse action decisions
to the courts of appeals would save the time and expense of litigants,
and could also provide the ancillary benefit of settling the confusion
that exists over the basis of court jurisdiction in this area and of articu-
lating the permissible scope of judicial review."6 A further ancillary
but decidedly beneficial effect would be the enhancement of the status
of the Civil Service Commission in the federal administrative scheme,
for nearly all major agencies' decisions are now directly reviewable in
a court of appeals. 87 The only major agency exception is the Interstate
Commerce Commission, whose orders are reviewable in a district
court.88 Some decisions of the smaller agencies, such as the Social Secur-
ity Administration, are also required by statute to be reviewed in a
district court.89
85 See, e.g., Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 829, 837 (D.C. Cir.), modified and vacated,
425 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Finfer v. Caplin, 344 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 882
U.S. 883 (1965); Pelicone v. Hodges, 320 F.2d 754, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
86 See notes 11-32 and accompanying text supra.
87 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970) (FTC); id. §§ 771, 78y(a) (SEC); 16 id. § 8251(b)
(FPC); 28 id. § 2342 (FCC orders other than licensing decisions, Federal Maritime Comm'n
(FMC), AEC, Sec'y of Agriculture); 29 id. § 160(f) (NLRB); 47 id. § 402(b) (FCC licensing
orders); 49 id. § 1486(a) (CAB & FAA).
88 28 id. §§ 1336, 1398, 2321-25.
89 See 33 id. § 921(b) (compensation cases under Longshoremen's and Harbor
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Several common elements can be discerned in the statutes provid-
ing for direct agency review by a court of appeals. Most provide that
a person adversely affected or aggrieved by final agency action may ap-
peal to the court of appeals located either where a certain transaction
occurred, where the person affected resides or does business, or in the
District of Columbia. Several statutes provide explicitly that once juris-
diction is obtained, it shall be exclusive.90 Moreover, most provide that
the court shall apply the substantial evidence test as part of the scope
of review.91 Finally, nearly every statute provides that when the court
finds the record deficient, it must remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings. 92
Such statutes could be easily adapted to apply to adverse ac-
tion appeals. As a first step, the statutory right of appeal of adverse
agency actions to the Civil Service Commission should be expanded
to include all federal nonmilitary, competitive service employees who
have completed a probationary period.93 This should evoke little or no
Worker's Act); 42 id. § 405(g) (decisions under the Social Security Act). Commenting on this
situation, Professor Jaffe has stated "The obvious theory of a district court venue is that
the typical plaintiff is a person of modest means." L. JAFFE, supra note 10, at 158. How-
ever, this justification seems misplaced. It is, indeed, rather dear from the adverse action
cases that many district court decisions eventually end up in the courts of appeals. See
notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra. Certainly, this is more expensive than seeking
review directly and solely in a court of appeals, and is particularly regrettable when what
is at issue is nothing less than a biweekly paycheck. In addition, seeking direct court of
appeals review should cost no more than seeking initial review by the district court, and
should be no more time-consuming.
Another statute providing for judicial review in a district court is 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08
(1970). The substantive provisions of this statute prohibit certain political activity by
state and local government employees whose employment is connected with federally-
funded activities. The Civil Service Commission has the duty to investigate alleged viola-
tions and to determine by a hearing whether the employee should be removed from his
office. The federal funding may be stopped if the employee is not removed after an affirma-
tive finding. Judicial review is entrusted to the district court by section 1508.
90 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(d) (1970) (FTC); id. § 77i, 78y(a) (SEC); 16 id. § 8251(b) (FPC);
28 id. § 2342 (FCC orders other than licensing decisions, FMC, AEC, Sec'y of Agriculture).
91 E.g., 15 id. § 78y(a) (SEC); 16 id. § 8251(b) (FPC); 29 id. § 160(f) (NLRB); 49 id.
§ 1486(e) (CAB and FAA).
92 15 id. § 45(c) (FTC); id. § 77i, 78y(a) (SEC); 16 id. § 8251(b) (FPC); 49 id. § 1486(d)
(CAB and FAA).
One review statute providing a slight variation is the Judicial Review Act of 1950, as
amended, 28 id. §§ 2341-51, which establishes court of appeals review for certain
decisions of the FCC, AEC, FMC, and the Secretary of Agriculture. Section 2347 provides
that when the agency has not held a hearing and the court determines that although a
hearing was not required by law there is a material issue of fact, it must transfer the
proceedings to a district court for a factual hearing. Id. § 2347(b)(3). This provision has
been severely criticized. See Comment, Review of Administrative Rulings: The Anomaly
of District Court Fact-Finding, 19 CATH. U.L. RLv. 215 (1969).
93 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (1970).
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opposition, since as a result of executive order94 nonveteran employees
have already been given all the rights of veterans in the adverse action
area, including the right to appeal to the Commission.
With federal employees, veteran and nonveteran alike, afforded
the statutory right to appeal adverse actions to the Commission, a
judicial review statute could be formulated. The provisions of such a
statute might include the following language:
Any employee aggrieved by a final decision of the Commission
pursuant to section 7701 of Title 5 may obtain review of such
decision exclusively in the Court of Appeals of the United States
within any circuit wherein such person resides, or in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in
such court, within sixty days after entry of such decision, a written
petition praying that the decision of the Commission be reversed
or modified in whole or in part. Upon the filing of such petition
such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or
reverse such decision, in whole or in part. The finding of the Com-
mission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive.9 5 If either party shall apply to the court for leave to
adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of
the court that such additional evidence is material and that there
were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evidence in the
hearing before the Commission, the court may order such addi-
tional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be ad-
duced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and
conditions as to the court may seem proper. The judgment and
decree of the court, affirming, modifying, enforcing, or setting
aside, in whole or in part, any such decision of the Commission,
shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United
94 Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521, 527 (1959-63 Comp.).
95 The proposed statute would make dear that the "substantial evidence" test con-
stitutes part of the courts' scope of review of the Commission's findings of fact. The other
two tests discussed earlier (notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra), which cover matters
other than review of the findings of fact would also appear applicable on the basis of the
APA's scope of review section (5 US.C. § 706 (1970)). See note 41 supra. Even if section
706 were determined not to be applicable to adverse action appeals, however, courts could
still reverse the Commission if they found its action to be arbitrary and capricious or
procedurally defective. Not only is there a well established, existing body of decisional
law for each of these review standards in adverse action appeals (notes 30-31 supra), but
additional standards were applied in analogous areas of administrative law prior to the
1946 enactment of the APA, although the judicial review statutes involved referred only
to "substantial evidence." See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 US. 376, 380 (1945)
(purpose of judicial review is to guard against "arbitrary action" by the Board); Shawmut
Ass'n v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 796 (Ist Cir. 1945) (SEC economic opinion not "capricious to
reasonable men"); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 139 F.2d 445, 451 (3d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 US. 798 (1944) ("arbitrary and capricious" test applied); Berkshire
Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 139 F.2d 134, 136-38 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 747
(1944) (inquiry into procedural adequacy of the Board hearing).
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States upon certiorari or certification as provided in sections 346
and 347 of Title 28.
No further statutory revisions would be necessary to make the
jurisdiction exclusive. As provided in the judicial review section of the
Administrative Procedure Act,96 the proper form of review "is the
special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a
court specified by statute .... -97 It is only "in the absence or inade-
quacy" of such a jurisdictional statute that the form of review should
then be "any applicable form of legal action, including actions for
declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction
or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction."9' 8 Presumably,
such an "applicable form of legal action" includes the mandamus pro-
vision, 99 which has frequently been called upon in the past to serve as a
basis for district court jurisdiction in employee adverse action reviews. 0 0
Therefore, with the enactment of such a statute, the mandamus action
would no longer be a permissible method of seeking judicial review in
employee adverse actions.
C. The Role of the Court of Claims and the District Courts
One beneficial effect of vesting exclusive power of judicial review
in courts of appeals would be to diminish substantially the role of the
Court of Claims and the district courts in adverse action cases. It should
be noted, however, that while the suggested statute would vest in the
courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to decide the legality of adverse
actions, litigable issues would often remain for the Court of Claims or
a district court. Several issues could arise when, for example, after an
employee is reinstated pursuant to a court of appeals decision, he and
the government disagree as to the amount of back pay the employee
is owed. Normally an employee recovers only an amount equal to
what he would have received during the period in question if the ad-
verse action had not occurred. °10 Accordingly, a crucial issue often arises
as to whether the employee was ready, willing, and able to work during
the period in question. 02 Also, there must be deducted from the amount
96 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
97 Id. § 703.
9s Id.
99 28 id. § 1361.
oo See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
101 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1) (1970).
102 See, e.g., Graves v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 68, 77 (1966) (recovery denied where
showing that claimant was receiving disability compensation during period for which he
claimed back pay precluded finding that he was able to return to work during that period);
Armand v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 339, 343 (1956) (to the same effect where employee
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recoverable any amount actually earned by the employee through other
employment during the period in question,103 a requirement which
may call for judicial findings. In addition, disputes may arise as to the
proper computation of back pay with regard to within-grade and statu-
tory pay increases occurring during the period of the employee's ab-
sence. Since the regulations governing adverse actions do not provide
for adjudication of these issues, they are proper for Court of Claims or
district court determination under the Back Pay Act.10 4
The proposed legislation would not foreclose the Court of Claims
or the federal district courts from hearing and deciding de novo any
claims for money judgments by employees who are neither afforded
the full procedural protection of the Civil Service Commission regula-
tions nor given the statutory right to appeal an adverse action of the
Civil Service Commission. Legislative or judicial branch employees not
occupying a position in the competitive service, temporary employees,
employees whose appointment must be confirmed by the Senate, and
employees serving in a probationary capacity, among others, would thus
be free to bring original actions in the Court of Claims or in district
courts.
CONCLUSION
The present scheme of judicial review for federal employees
aggrieved by an adverse action decision is unnecessarily costly and in-
efficient. Delays can be inordinate.10 5 The more sensible arrangement
suggested by this article would provide direct and exclusive judicial
review in the courts of appeals, would enhance the stature of the Civil
Service Commission, and would remove the confusion over the bases
of jurisdiction and scope of review in this area.
had been committed to a mental hospital, then released and placed on a disability pension
during the period in question).
103 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1) (1970).
104 See note 48 supra.
105 In Holden v. Finch, 446 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the Civil Service Commission
denied jurisdiction in August 1966. The decision in the court of appeals was rendered in
May 1971. Even assuming as much as a one-year delay in filing suit in the district court,
the employee waited almost four years for a decision.
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